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Abstract: 
It is not uncommon for large companies in China, especially SOEs, to be bailed out with 
government funds or bank loans. This article explores the bailouts of non-financial companies in 
the country with empirical and theoretical analysis. It finds that the government, especially the 
local governments are keen to bail out large companies in order to prevent social instability. Also, 
bailouts in China are still erratic and unprincipled. When bailouts are carried out under the 
bankruptcy law, legal principles are frequently undermined to the detriment of the creditors. This 
article argues that bailouts and governmental intervention in general must be constrained with 
legal principles so that inefficient companies can be closed down and resource can be allocated 
more efficiently.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Palgrave Dictionary of Economics defines a bailout as 'the rescue of an economic entity from 
potential or actual insolvency', usually carried out by a national government, a central bank or an 
international organisation.1 The 2008 financial crisis has provided ample examples of bailouts as 
many financial institutions collapsed. Non-financial companies can also be bailed out by the 
government, for example, utility and airline companies, if they are considered ‘too-big-to-fail'.2 
In the EU, bailouts are regulated by the regime of rescue and restructuring aid (R&R aid), which 
is an exception to the state aids rule that prohibits the Member States from giving subsidies or 
other aid to businesses.3 Under the regime, R&R aid for a firm in difficulty may be considered 
compatible with the common market at the discretion of the European Commission.4  
In the US, bailouts are not regulated through a formal legal regime. Although the US Bankruptcy 
Code (BC) already contains a reorganisation procedure (Chapter 11) that aims to revive a 
distressed company rather than put it into liquidation, some financial institutions were bailed out 
on an ad-hoc basis during the 2008 financial crisis.5 This has led to controversies over the 
government’s decisions on bailouts vs. bankruptcy, which are criticised as erratic and arbitrary. 
It has been argued that the bankruptcy is a more effective alternative to bailouts if carried out in 
a transparent way.6  
In China, the economic reform in the past decades is transforming the country into a market-
oriented economy. In the old days of planned economy, the government could command the 
allocation of resources and inject funds directly into State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs), which 
were equivalent to governmental affiliations. In contrast, today's China features a fast-growing 
private sector and SOEs that have a shareholder system. In theory, the government can only 
intervene as a neutral regulator or as the dominating shareholder in an SOE. However, the 
government shows path dependent tendencies to inject funds into SOEs as well as private 
                                                 
1 ‘The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online’ (dictionaryofeconomics.com) 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/resources/default/bailout> accessed July 2017. 
2 S Azgad-Tromer, ‘Too Important to Fail: Bankruptcy Versus Bailout of Socially Important Non-Financial 
Institutions’ (2015) <http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Too-Important-to-Fail-Bankruptcy-Versus-
Bailout-of-Socially-Important-Non-Financial-Institutions.pdf> accessed July 2017. 
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as adopted by the Treaty of Lisbon, [2010] OJ C83/49, article 
107: “ Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market.” 
4 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, [2014] OJ C 
249/01, p.1 
5 For example, Bear Sterns and ALG were bailed out, while Lehman applied for Chapter 11 reorganisation. See S 
Ben-Ishai and SJ Lubben, ‘A Comparative Study of Bankruptcy as Bailout’ (2011) 6 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. 
L. 79. 
6 ibid. 
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companies, in order to prevent social repercussions caused by the demise of large companies. 
Also, ‘too-big-to-fail’ companies are often fostered by the government in the first place.  
This article will focus on the bailouts of non-financial companies in China7 and argue that the 
unprincipled bailouts in the country has created market distortions and undermined the legal 
principles . It begins with a historical account of the restructuring of SOEs from the 1990s to the 
early 2000s, during which bailouts were frequent and the bankruptcy was often used to bail out 
local SOEs, which could escape bank debts through bankruptcy under the support of local 
governments. Then it will discuss the current bankruptcy law in China and use case analysis to 
demonstrate that legal principles and creditors’ interests are still often disregarded when bailouts 
are carried out under the bankruptcy law. After depicting the problems of bailouts in China, the 
article will make a theoretical discussion of bailouts and propose for policy changes in the future. 
The final section will conclude the article. 
2. BAILOUTS IN CHINA: A HISTORICAL REVIEW  
2.1 Bailouts and the Restructuring of SOEs   
After Deng expressed his support for 'shareholding system (gufen zhi)' in his famous 1992 speech, 
the 14th third-plenary meeting of the party set the goal of establishing a ‘modern enterprise 
system’ in 1993, which marks the start of the restructuring of SOEs.8 The same year saw the 
enactment of the Company Law, which is the first modern company law in post-1949 China. 
Company Law 1993 has established the basic features for modern companies— legal personality, 
transferable shares, limited liability for shareholders and centralised management. 9  With 
transferable shares, SOEs could transfer shares to private and foreign parties and thus obtain 
capital injections. The reform of the SOEs was driven by the lack of funds in SOEs and focused 
on rescuing unprofitable enterprises rather than fostering those relatively well performed.10  
In the 1990s, bank loans replaced the direct grants from the government as the main source of 
funding for SOEs and State-Owned-Banks (SOBs) were tasked with bailing out the SOEs. As 
SOEs’ financial circumstances deteriorated, the bank system was saddled with bad debt.11 To 
solve this problem, the State Council launched the Capital Structure Optimisation Program 
                                                 
7 There are no detailed rules for the bankruptcy of financial institutions in China although they are permitted to 
apply for bankruptcy under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (EBL).  
8 B Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (MIT Press 2007), p 301. Also see D Xiao, ‘The 
Road of Reform for SOEs [国有企业改革之路]’ [2014] Research on Party History [中共党史研究] 9. 
9 A business corporation has five defining characteristics: (1) legal personality; (2) limited liability; (3) 
transferable shares; (4) centralised management; (5) ownership shared by equity investors. See Reinier Kraakman, 
Paul Davies, and Henry Hansmann, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a Comparative and Functional Approach, 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), p 5. 
10  Xiao, ‘The Road of Reform for SOEs”. 
11 G Yi, The Monetisation in China[中国的货币化进程] (Commercial Press[商务印书馆] 2003), p 350. 
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(CSOP)  in 1994 which assigned ‘debt write off quota’ to SOE bankruptcies and mergers.12 SOBs 
would use funds provided by the state to write off the debts owed by SOEs based on the quotas 
assigned to them. It was mandated that proceeds of selling land use rights be used first to pay 
workers and retirees and housing and other social assets be excluded from the bankruptcy estate.13 
Further, under the programme, the merger was the main restructuring alternative to bankruptcy 
for SOEs. 
 
In 1995, the government stated that it would ‘keep the large and let the small go’ (zhuada 
fangxiao), namely, to retain the control of the largest SOEs owned by the central government and 
privatise collective enterprises and small SOEs owned by the local governments. This decision 
was justified by the poor performance of local SOEs and the crucial role of central SOEs.14 
However, these measures did not improve the balance sheets of SOEs significantly and the 
eruption of the Asian financial crisis had aggravated the situation. In 1998, industrial SOEs 
incurred losses estimated at RMB 80 billion with profits only at RMB 120 billion.15 In 1999, the 
average debt-for-equity ratio in Chinese SOEs reached as high as 75%.16 It was estimated that 
the level of NPLs in SOBs reached 25% or higher and the banks were technically bankrupt.17 To 
deal with the problems, the government announced the objective to reduce the number of loss-
making SOEs within three years (1999-2001). During this period, the bankruptcy took priority 
over the merger and the number of bankruptcy cases surged.  In 1999, 133 major bankruptcy 
cases were approved and acquired an average write-off quota of RMB 135 million or a total of 
18 billion.18  
                                                 
12 State Council, ‘Notice of the State Council on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Pilot Implementation of 
Bankruptcy of a State-Owned Enterprise in Some Cities[关于在若干城市试行国有企业破产有关问题的通
知](Guofa No. 1994/59)’ (lawinfochina.com, 1994) <http://www.lawinfochina.com/> accessed April 2017. 
13 State Council, ‘Supplementary Notice of the State Council on the Relevant Issues About the Pilot 
Implementation of the Merger and Bankruptcy of State-Owned Enterprises in Some Cities and the Reemployment 
of Workers[关于在若干城市试行国有企业兼并破产和职工再就业有关问题的补充通知] Guofa No.1997/10)’ 
(lawinfochina.com, 1997) <http://www.lawinfochina.com/> accessed April 2017. 
14 IMF, ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’ (imf.org, October 2016) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16203.pdf> accessed March 2017, p 29. 
15 World Bank, ‘Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: a Case and Agenda for Reforming the Insolvency 
System’ (documents.worldbank.org, 20 September 2000) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/09/14451105/bankruptcy-state-enterprises-china-case-agenda-
reforming-insolvency-system> accessed 1 September 2013. 
16 Q Guan, ‘Does Debt-for Swap Mean Opportunity for Banks and Rescue for Enterprises [债转股是银行的契机 
企业的救赎?]’ (finance.ifeng.com, April 2016) <http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20160407/14311026_0.shtml> 
accessed 19 January 2017. 
17  Yi, The Monetisation in China, p 346. 
18 World Bank, ‘Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: a Case and Agenda for Reforming the Insolvency 
System’. 
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In the same year, the government established four Asset Management Companies (AMC) in 1999, 
to carry out bailouts of SOEs and SOBs through a debt-for-equity swap scheme.19 The four 
AMCs—Huarong, Cinda, Great Wall and Dongfang—were respectively paired up with the big 
four commercial banks-Bank of China (BOC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). AMCs were funded 
by initial capital injections from the Ministry of Finance (MoF)(RMB1 hundred billion), 10-
year bonds issued to the four big banks (RMB 8.2 hundred billion), as well as borrowings 
from the PBC under the guarantee of the MoF (RMB 5.8 hundred billion).20 AMLs purchased 
the NPLs from the four big commercial banks and had completed their tasks of disposing the 
NPLs taken from the banks at the end of 2006, which amounts to RMB 1.4 trillion in total. The 
debt recovery rate is slightly below 20% on average.21  
On appearance, the AMCs had successfully achieved the goals set by the government. First, the 
balance sheets of four big banks were significantly improved after transferring NPLs to AMCs, 
paving the way for their IPOs.22 Second, the AMCs replaced the banks as the creditors of 
indebted SOEs and became shareholders through the debt-for-equity swap. There were 580 SOEs 
chosen by the government to be restructured in the debt-for-equity scheme, through which their 
average debt/asset ratio was reduced from 73% to below 50%.23 
However, the overall effects of the debt-for-equity swap are debatable. First, the swap was costly 
at the expense of taxpayers. By estimation in 2006, it had cost more than RMB 2.5 trillion of 
fiscal resources (equivalent to near one-third of 1998 GDP).24 Also, with a thin equity base, the 
AMCs were mainly funded by the borrowings from the PBC and the bonds issued to the 'big four 
banks' at an interest lower than market rates. The borrowings from the PBC were never repaid. 
AMCs were also unable to repay the bonds after they came due in 2009, which were rolled over 
for another 10 years with the guarantee provided by the MoF.25 The main explanation is that the 
AMCs were unable to gain much from the NPLs after paying the full price for them.26   
Second, the swap carried out by AMCs did not 'harden' the budget of SOEs but instead fulfilled 
the expectations that SOEs would be bailed out and thereby aggravated the moral hazard within 
                                                 
19 PBC, ‘Opinions on Implementing Debt-to-Equity Conversion［关于实施债权转股权若干问题的意见］’ 
(hk.lexiscn.com, July 1999) <https://hk.lexiscn.com/law/law-chinese-3-204001199911-T.html> accessed 21 
December 2016. 
20 Guonan Ma and Ben SC Fung, ‘China's asset management corporations’ (Bank for International Settlements 
2002); Guonan Ma, ‘Sharing China's Bank Restructuring Bill’ (2006) 14 China & World Economy 19–37 
21 G Yi, Reflections on the Financial Reform in China[中国金融改革思考录] (Commercial Press[商务印书馆] 
2009), p 291. 
22 Ma and Fung,‘China's Asset Management Corporations’; Ma, ‘Sharing China's Bank Restructuring Bill’. 
23 ibid. 
24 ibid. 
25 IMF, ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, p 29. 
26 S Breslin, ‘Financial Transitions in the PRC: Banking on the State?’ (2014) 35 Third World Quarterly 996. 
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SOEs and banks.27 This is because the shareholder role of the AMCs is largely illusory and they 
did not impose much disciplinary effect on the management. In fact, directors of SOEs and the 
local government were enthusiastic about the swap because the capital injected by the AMCs was 
‘cheaper’ than the bank loans, contrary to the corporate finance theory that equity is more costly 
than debts as it requires more returns.28Also, as the management of the loss-making management 
usually would continue to be in charge, they viewed the swap as a debt write-off without 
significant negative consequences.29 Since the swap did not strengthen the financial discipline of 
SOEs or transform their corporate governance structure, it was actually a bailout that only gave 
short-term boosts in the balance sheet without improving the long-term performance of the 
troubled SOEs.  As the economic growth slowed down in recent years, many of these SOEs once 
again become heavily indebted and are potential targets for the current debt-for-equity scheme.30 
Third, although the plan was that AMCs only acted as shareholders provisionally and would exit 
within 10 years, in fact, AMCs are still stuck with massive shareholdings converted from debts 
and unable to gain profits from selling these shares.31 This has contributed to the default of AMCs 
in the bonds issued to the banks. In cases where AMCs had successfully exited, the government 
usually shouldered the burden. For example, Liaoning SASAC became the major shareholder of 
Dongbei Special Steel by purchasing shares from Huarong, one of the four major AMCs. In 2016, 
Special Steel became mired in debt once again and requested for another round of debt-for-equity 
swap.32  
In summary, the above discussion has briefly discussed the restructuring of Chinese SOEs from 
the 1990s to the early 2000s. Bailouts were frequent during this period because the SOEs were 
highly inefficient and most of them were making huge losses. The next section will focus on the 
                                                 
27 SOEs actually have a 'soft budget' that enables them to continue to receive financing and make investments 
regardless of failures. This is in contrast with ‘hard budget’ under which a company has to pay for its failures with 
its own income. The lack of hard budget constrains creates perverse incentives of managers, who are prone to 
overlook the need for cash as they assume they can always maintain liquidity by governmental subsidies or bank 
loans. See J Kornai, ‘The Soft Budget Constraint’ (1986) 39 Kyklos 3. 
28 Chinese companies’ inclination for the equity market over the bond market is at variance with the pecking order 
theory that companies proceed from debt to equity in raising funds. 
29  Yi, Reflections on the Financial Reform in China, p 355.  
30 For example, during the last swap, Cinda has taken over bad debts in many SOEs of the coal industry and 
became the major shareholder by converting debts into equity, however, it was excluded from the management by 
the local governments. In recent years, Chinese coal companies once again slipped into the quandary of whether to 
reduce overcapacity and make millions of workers redundant. See ‘Reducing Overcapacity in Coal and Steel [煤钢
艰难去产能]’ (magazine.caijing.com.cn, February 2016) 
<http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20160223/4072826.shtml> accessed 19 January 2017. 
31 ‘Reply of State Council to Cinda: the Finance Pays for Soured Assets Estimated at Two Hundred Billion [国务
院批复信达转型 2000亿问题资产财政兜底]’ (finance.sina.com.cn, June 2016) 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100620/23368142940.shtml> accessed 18 January 2017. 
32 ‘The Deadlock for Dongbei Special Steel [东北特钢债务陷入僵局]’ (news.xinhuanet.com, 2016) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-07/26/c_129178715.htm> accessed 21 January 2017. The bankruptcy 
case of Dongbei Special Steel will be further discussed.  
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bankruptcy of SOEs at the time, which was often used as a means of bailout as SOEs could escape 
their bank debts through bankruptcy under the support of local governments. 
2.2 Policy Bankruptcies and Debt Evasion  
As discussed above, the bankruptcy procedure was used to close down loss-making SOEs from 
the 1990s to 2000s, with funds provided by the central government to compensate employees 
and write off bank debts. In addition, the Interim Bankruptcy Law 1986, the bankruptcy law 
applicable at the time, only provides for the bankruptcy of SOEs and ranks employees in priority 
to secured creditors.33 Directed by the governmental policies, the bankruptcy during this time is 
called ‘policy bankruptcy’ 34 with little regard to creditors’ interests.35  
In fact, the bankruptcy was an administrative procedure dominated by local governments  and 
the courts only played a rubber-stamp role.36 With the support of the local governments, many 
local SOEs applied for bankruptcy voluntarily in order to evade debts.37 After they filed for 
bankruptcy, they would continue to operate on the same site with the same management after 
they filed for bankruptcy.38 
                                                 
33 Interim Bankruptcy Law 1986, article 37 
34 As the restructuring of SOEs completed, policy bankruptcy was put to an end in 2008. See R Li, ‘Report on 
Supervision of State Assets and SOE Reform［关于国有资产监管和国有企业改革情况的报告］’ (npc.gov.cn, 
26 April 2005) <http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2005-05/30/content_5341707.htm> accessed 2 November 
2016. 
35 Banks clearly had incurred substantial losses during the restructuring of SOEs as they could only recover only 3-
10% of their claims while laid off employees of large SOEs were usually entitled to a substantial amount of 
compensation. See World Bank, ‘Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: a Case and Agenda for Reforming the 
Insolvency System’. 
36 ibid. 
37 S Cao, ‘Legislation and Implementation of Chinese Bankruptcy Law in a Decade［十年来中国破产法的立法
与实施］’ (modernchinastudies.org, 1997) <http://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/57-mcs-
1997-issue-2/400-2011-12-29-17-45-11.html> accessed 28 November 2016. 
38 There were various means of escaping bank debts through bankruptcy. For example, an enterprise could merge 
with others to form a new company, transferred its assets to the new company, and then went into bankruptcy. It 
could also distribute the proceeds of the sale of assets regardless of the bank’s claim as a secured creditor. At the 
same time, the enterprise would tamper with the asset/debt ratio, inflate the bankruptcy fees, and reduce the value 
of the bankruptcy estate. See State Council, ‘Notice on Evading Bank Debts by PBC(Forwarded by State Council) 
[国务院办公厅转发人民银行关于企业逃废金融债务有关情况报告的通知]’ (chinaacc.com, 2001) 
<http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63/69/110/2001/4/ad98071930111214100221060.htm> accessed 15 November 
2016. 
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The number of bankruptcies reached a peak in 200139 and many cases involved debt evasion 
supported by local governments.40 Both local officials41 and the managers of SOEs believed that 
the bankruptcy was a means to relieve the SOEs of debts.  A survey has found that 90% CEOs 
of SOEs reckoned bankruptcy could be used to resolve debt problems.42 Also, the debts owed to 
state banks were believed to be owed to the central government and could be written off.43 
Employees' priority in the bankruptcy procedure was used to facilitate debt escape. The 
management would increase the employees' claims before filing for bankruptcy. Then the assets 
were transferred to the employees, nullifying the debts owed to the banks. The assets were only 
held by the employees in the name and then could be used to obtain new funding for the 
company.44  
To summarise, debt evasion through bankruptcy can be viewed as bailouts of local SOEs at the 
cost of state banks. The bankruptcy during the SOE restructuring was far from a collective 
mechanism for creditors to enforce their debts. The following sections will discuss the 
ramifications of the SOE restructuring that will lock the bankruptcy law in the old path. 
2.3 Ramifications of the SOE Restructuring   
2.3.1 Dismantling of Social Security System  
The restructuring of SOEs from the 1990s to the early 2000s led to more than 20 million SOE 
workers being laid-off.45 They received some compensation from the state, however, as the life-
long job in SOEs was bundled with housing, health care and social security, most of them became 
disadvantaged in the absence of a sound social welfare system.  
During this time, the government also started to dismantle the social security system that is 
attached to SOEs and established a new system under which both individuals and their employees 
                                                 
39 Also see 21 Century News, ‘SPC Report Claims That SOEs Account for 80% of the 40,000 Bankruptcy Cases
［最高法报告称 4万起破产案中国企集体企业占 8成］’ (finance.sina.com.cn, 2014) 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140904/030720206424.shtml> accessed 15 November 2016. 
40 As of the end of 2000, 51.29 % of all the restructured (gaizhi) enterprises had evaded bank debts, according to 
the survey on those that had bank accounts with the major SOEs. The bad debts they incurred amounted to 31.96% 
of the entire bank loans (plus interests) allotted to restructured enterprises. It was commercial banks owned by the 
state that had suffered most from the wave of debt defaults. See State Council, ‘Notice on Evading Bank Debts by 
PBC(Forwarded by State Council)’. 
41 For example, the officials of Pingu, a county in Beijing, even proclaimed, ‘By getting rid of debts through 
bankruptcy, enterprises could continue to operate with the existing factory and equipment.’ As a result, some 
enterprises in the county, which had relatively good performance, went into bankruptcy to escape bank debts. They 
changed their name and continue their operations in the old site. It had been found that 88.51% of the restructured 
enterprises in the county had escaped bank debts, resulting in bad debts comprising 78.19% of the bank loans 
extended to the local restructured enterprises. See ibid. 
42 BM Fleisher, Policy Reform and Chinese Markets: Progress and Challenges (Edward Elgar 2008), p 54. 
43 ibid. 
44 W Weiguo, ‘The Order of Payment of Workers'  Claims and Security Interests Under China’s New Bankruptcy 
Law’ (search.oecd.org, 2006) <http://search.oecd.org/china/38182499.pdf> accessed June 2017. 
45 K Ngok and CK Chan, China's Social Policy: Transformation and Challenges (Taylor & Francis 2015), p 67. 
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were required to share the cost of social security with the state.46 This means that laid-off workers 
were excluded from the social safety net without a new job. In order to maintain social stability, 
the government established re-employment centres to help workers find new jobs and offered 
them an 'unemployment insurance' that ensured basic livelihood. However, many laid-off 
workers still could not find new jobs and became the main source of urban poor with no basic 
social protections.47 Further, the widening income and the managerial corruption during the 
restructuring led to growing anger among former SOE employees whose living standards 
continued to deteriorate.48  
All these factors contributed to a rising number of 'mass accidents' by laid-off workers, namely 
collective protests in the public arena. Many protests were spurred by the restructuring schemes 
that involved collective layoffs in order to ‘improve industrial efficiency’. It has been estimated 
that from 1993 to 2003, the number of mass accidents rose from 10,000 to 60,000 and it continued 
to increase to 74,000 in 2004 and then to 87,000 in 2005.49 Faced with increasing challenges 
caused by massive laid-offs, the government proposed the vision of a  ‘harmonious society’ to 
promote social stability in 2005.50 The stress on social stability and employment is one of the 
factors that led local governments to protect local enterprises. This will be further discussed in 
the following.  
2.3.2 Perverse Incentives of Local Governments  
Local governments in China have strong incentives to protect local companies because they 
derive financial benefits from doing so. To begin with, local governments are still the 
shareholders of many local companies after the privatisation and this fosters widespread local 
protectionism in China.51 Further, local enterprises produce tax revenues for local governments 
under the tax sharing system established in 1994. Under the system, taxes were divided into the 
central tax, local taxes and taxes shared between local governments and the central government. 
Also, parallel systems for collecting local and central taxes were established. The tax sharing 
system has motivated local governments to promote the local economy and generate revenues.52 
In addition to financial benefits, local officials also have strong political incentives to promote 
local companies. First, the GDP is the main indicator for their performance in promoting 
                                                 
46 Y Sha, ‘China’s Social Security System: Present Status and Issues’ (2007) 
<http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11850484.pdf#page=49> accessed June 2017. 
47 Ngok and Chan, China's Social Policy: Transformation and Challenges, p 36.  
48 J Fewsmith, ‘Assessing Social Stability on the Eve of the 17th Party Congress’ (2007) 20 China Leadership 
Monitor 1. 
49 ibid. 
50 K-M Chan, ‘Harmonious Society’ (www.cuhk.edu.hk, 2010) 
<http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/centre/ccss/publications/km_chan/CKM_14.pdf> accessed June 2017. 
51 P Keller, Law and the Market Economy in China (Taylor & Francis 2017), p 429. 
52 Q Zhang and S Li, ‘Key Issues of Central and Local Government Finance in the People's Republic of China’ 
(2016) <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2893347> accessed July 2017. 
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economic growth.53 The central government would set GDP targets for local officials. If they 
achieved the target or even better, they could be promoted to a higher rank. 
Second, social stability is also an important benchmark for local officials and the collapse of 
large companies would cause social instability. The central government has reiterated that 
political stability is essential for the economy and made it an essential assessment criterion for 
local officials.54 As is discussed above, the reform of SOEs has led to the dismantling of the old 
welfare system based on SOEs and a structural undersupply of public goods.55 After the closing 
of SOEs, former SOE workers became severely deprived losing their pension and healthcare. 
With rising social inequality, it is increasingly difficult for local governments to suppress ‘mass 
incidents’ and maintain social stability. Nevertheless, the central government requires local 
governments to ensure '‘no small incidents out of village, no big incidents out of town, no 
conflicts transferred to the superior’.56 Faced with such pressure, local officials often have to 
meet all the demands by the 'instability groups', including laid-off workers that ask the 
government to pay instead of their employer.57 
To summarise, local governments in China are strongly motivated, both by economic and 
political reasons to protect local enterprises. In order to maintain local revenues and employment, 
local governments would prevent local enterprises from going into bankruptcy liquidation, or 
attempt to bend the bankruptcy law to the benefits of the debtor. As in the SOE restructuring 
period, bankruptcy has been frequently used as a means to bail out companies. This will be 
discussed in details in the following sections.  
3. BAILOUTS AND BANKRUPTCY LAW IN CHINA  
3.1 Overview of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 
The current bankruptcy law in China, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL), was promulgated 
in 2006. It applies to all enterprises and replaces the Interim Bankruptcy Law 1986 that only 
applied to SOEs. The EBL 2006 provides for three bankruptcy procedures—liquidation, 
reorganisation and conciliation. The provisions on liquidation and reorganisation are analogous 
                                                 
53 H Li and L-A Zhou, ‘Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in 
China’ (2005) 89 Journal of Public Economics 1743. 
54 Y He and G Wang, ‘Order in Chaos: Re-Understand Social Instability in China’ (2016) 1 Journal of Chinese 
Governance 228. 
55 Sha, ‘China’s Social Security System: Present Status and Issues’ (2007).  
56 He and Wang, ‘Order in Chaos: Re-Understand Social Instability in China’. 
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to those in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code (BC) 1978. In general, the EBL 
resembles closely to the US BC in basic principles, however, a closer examination will reveal 
that Chinese bankruptcy law is still subject to political and historical factors that have undermined 
its development.  
To begin with, the initiation of bankruptcy cases in China is being controlled by the local 
governments. In order to enter into the bankruptcy procedure, SOEs have to apply for the 
approval by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). In 
addition, the courts require companies to submit plans for workers resettlement in addition to 
financial documents when applying for bankruptcy. Even all the requirements are met, the courts 
may still reject bankruptcy cases due to the opposition of the local government.58 This has made 
it very difficult for Chinese companies to go into the bankruptcy procedure. It has been found 
that court-based bankruptcy cases account for a very small proportion of all company dissolutions 
in China. 
Second, the priority rule under the Chinese bankruptcy law is shaped by the concerns for 
unemployment. As in the US, secured creditors rank highest in the repayment under the EBL 
2006, followed by holders of priority claims including administrative expenses, employees’ 
compensation and tax claims (from high to low). The rest of the bankruptcy assets will go to the 
unsecured creditors. However, it has made an exceptional rule that the employees’ claims that 
occurred before 2006 rank above secured creditors. This is a transitional provision to replace the 
rule that employees are paid before creditors under Interim Bankruptcy Law 1986, the 
predecessor of the EBL 2006. It reflects the government’s concern for the social instability caused 
by unemployment that follows bankruptcy. 
Third, although the EBL 2006 introduces court-appointed administrators to oversee the 
bankruptcy procedures, in practice the role of the administrator is often assumed by government 
officials. The EBL 2006 provides that administrators can be liquidation teams, law firms, 
accountancy firms, bankruptcy firms, or any other public intermediary agency that may serve as 
an administrator. Liquidation teams consist mostly of governmental officials as courts are 
required to choose members of the liquidation team from the ‘interim emergency team’, which 
is established by local governments to deal with distressed companies in the region before formal 
bankruptcy. The fact that local governments are the controlling shareholders of local SOEs casts 
doubt on the independence of the liquidation team acting as the administrator in bankruptcy. 
Fourth, the reorganisation procedure provided by the EBL 2006 is often used by the local 
governments to ‘bail out’ large companies at the cost of creditors.  The purpose of reorganisation 
procedure is to enhance creditors’ value and give the debtor a ‘second chance’. However, under 
the governmental intervention, the reorganisation procedure in China has been used to prolong 
the life of unprofitable companies. It has been found that it is relatively common for Chinese 
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courts to ‘cram down’ reorganisation plans, namely to force creditors to accept reorganisation 
plans despite their opposition.  
The wide use of cramming down reorganisation plans by the courts has given rise to the criticism 
that the courts have disregarded two basic principles in the reorganisation—the absolute priority 
rule and the best interest rule. Under the US BC, the absolute priority rule must be satisfied for 
the reorganisation plan to be crammed down by the court. To be specific, first, if creditors rank 
in seniority oppose the reorganisation plan, they must be paid before junior creditors. Second, 
shareholders can receive no distributions from the bankruptcy estate under the reorganisation 
plan if it is opposed by the unsecured creditors.59 It has been argued that there is an absolute 
priority rule in the EBL,60 which provides that a reorganisation plan can only be crammed down 
without the approval of secured creditors and priority creditors (employees, tax claimants) if 
these groups are fully paid. However, the adoption of the absolute priority rule is only partial as 
the EBL fails to assert the priority of unsecured creditors over shareholders. The EBL also 
contains a statement of the 'best interest rule’,61 which requires that creditors receive at least as 
much value as the creditor would receive in the liquidation if the court crams down the 
reorganisation plan despite their opposition.   
An empirical research has found that the best interest rule has usually been complied with, at 
least superficially. However, the absolute priority rule is routinely contravened in the 
reorganisations of Chinese listed companies and social stability is prioritised over creditors' 
interests. Particularly, unsecured creditors have a low recovery rate in the reorganisations.62   
Creditors’ interests are further undermined by the lack of provision on the absence of provisions 
on refinancing under Chinese bankruptcy law. In contrast, the US BC provides that new 
borrowings incurred by the DIP63 are superior to existing debts.64  The unclear status of new 
funds given to the debtor increases the risks for creditors and creditors often suffer more losses 
as a result of offering new funds. 
In summary, the problem of governmental intervention still looms large in the bankruptcy 
procedure and has undermined the basic principles of the bankruptcy law. To further illustrate 
this point, the following section will provide an analysis of typical cases in which the government 
has assumed a dominant role.  
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3.2 Case Studies  
In response to the slowed economic growth and massive corporate debt, the Chinese government 
has launched a ‘supply-side reform’ to reduce debt and cut overcapacity. The bankruptcy law has 
come into the fore as a principal measure to close down inefficient companies.65 Consequently, 
the number of bankruptcy cases has risen sharply since 2016 (see Table I and Figure I). Many 
recent bankruptcy cases involve large industrial and manufacturing enterprises that received 
massive state subsidies and had overproduced. Some high-tech industries, such as the solar 
industry, have also received substantial governmental funds and now are in predicament. The 
following subsections will use examples of steel companies and solar companies to demonstrate 
the governmental role in creating the problem of overproduction and bailing out the failed 
companies.  
3.2.1 Steel Companies  
The steel industry in China is one of the most overproduced industries in the country. As part of 
the efforts of the supply-side reform, the government has started to eliminate the capacity of the 
steel industry and reduce the number of steel companies by mergers, as well as bankruptcies. The 
government also launched a new round of debt-for-equity swaps to save viable companies.66 As 
stated by the government, the latest swap is ‘market-based’ as it will be led by banks (major 
creditors in China) and exclude the ‘zombie companies’.67 
The closing down of inefficient companies is bound to create a new wave of massive 
unemployment. The China International Capital Corp (CICC) estimates that from 2016 to 2017, 
overproduced industries in China, including coal and steel, would slash 30% of their 10 million 
workers.68 Compared with more than twenty million laid-off workers in the last round of reform, 
three million laid-off workers are much more manageable as they would only amount to 0.3% of 
the country’s urban population.69 
However, some regions would be hit particularly hard by the supply-side reform due to the 
concentration of heavy industries and the lack of alternative employment opportunities. For 
example, the Northeast region, the old industrial base in the country with the highest proportion 
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of zombie companies, will be shaken severely. 70  During the SOE restructuring period, the 
Northeast region had already seen the devastating effects of massive unemployment. From 1995 
to 2002, the total number of workers being laid off amounted to 7.3 million.71  
The Northeast region remains to be the ‘rust belt’ of the country since then and the economic 
downturns in recent years have brought many companies in the region into financial difficulty. 
For example, Dongbei Special Steel, a local SOE based in the northeastern city of Dalian, had 
defaulted on bonds ten times in the interbank bond market since March 2016. To forestall the 
bankruptcy proceedings, its controlling shareholder, the Liaoning SASAC proposed to creditors 
to convert most of their debts into equity and then creditors could exit through the equity market 
after the company was listed. The proposal had met fierce opposition from creditors who 
requested the National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (NAFMII), a self-
regulatory body of institutional investors that oversees the interbank bond market, to suspend 
bond issues of companies from Liaoning province and publicly denounce Special Steel. Creditors 
also requested state regulators to issue a blanket ban on the fundraising by companies from the 
region and suggested financial institutions avoid purchasing bonds issued by both Liaoning 
government and companies in the province. In the creditors’ eyes, the debt-for-equity swap 
proposed by Liaoning SASAC was a disguise for debt evasion.  Accordingly, the NAFMII issued 
a serious reprimand and suspended Special Steel from issuing bonds.  It was one of the factors 
that prompted Dalian Intermediate Court to finally accept reorganisation application filed by 
creditors on October 10, 2016. A document from Liaoning government revealed that in May 
2016, the company's debt-to-assets ratio had reached to 120% with its liabilities totalled at RMB 
55.6 billion. The banks' total credit exposure to the company is more than RMB 44 billion, half 
of which is contributed by local banks in Dalian.72 The Dalian court had permitted the submission 
of the plan to be postponed until May 10, 2017, exceeding the six months limit imposed by law.73 
The latest report on the case is that the company finally submitted its reorganisation plan to the 
court in July 2017.74 
The predicament of Special Steel has often been contrasted with Sinosteel, whose controlling 
shareholder is the national SASAC and therefore supposedly has the support of the central 
government. In October 2015, Sinosteel became the first Chinese steel company to default in the 
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interbank bond market with a debt-to-asset ratio of around 90%.  This debt-to-asset ratio is much 
higher than the industry average, which is around 65%. Despite its financial difficulties, the 
company was able to reach a debt-for-equity swap agreement with its creditors. According to the 
agreement, around half of the debts owed to banks and other institutions, which totalled at 60 
billion RMB, would be replaced by convertible bonds.75 Then the convertible bonds would be 
gradually converted into equity within sixth years. As the first debt-for-equity swap for an SOE 
in 17 years, it casts doubt on whether the swap is still a bailout rather than a ‘market-
based’ restructuring as claimed by the government.  
3.2.2 Solar Companies  
It should be noted that large private companies in China actually resemble SOEs in terms of 
market access, access to finance, governmental subsidies and governmental intervention. 
Strongly motivated to foster economic growth, both the state and local governments give 
generous support to private companies with growth potential and has the tendency to protect the 
incumbent firms.76 For fear of the social instability caused by massive unemployment, the state 
and the local governments also provide the implicit guarantee for large enterprises. This is 
especially true in regions that are dominated by a local champion.77  
The flourishing of the solar industry in China can largely be contributed to governmental 
subsidies and the competition of local governments to create local champions. When solar 
companies went into financial difficulties, local governments tried to forestall them from going 
into bankruptcy and then bail them out through the reorganisation procedure. Two leading solar 
companies, Suntech in Jiangsu province and LDK Solar in Jiangxi province, are good examples 
for this point.   
Both companies were established by entrepreneurs and then successfully listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Their fast growth can be attributed to the support of the local 
governments to a large extent. The government of Wuxi city, where Suntech is located, had 
invested 6 million US dollars in the company through local SOEs and government funds.78 It had 
also helped the company secure national subsidies, business opportunities and additional 
investments. When Suntech met financial difficulty, the mayor of Wuxi even expressed the 
government’s support for the company in September 2012 and helped it get a new loan from 
Bank of China.79 
                                                 
75 Y Jin, ‘Debt-for-Equity Swap of Sinosteel [中钢千亿负债破冰债转股]’ (epaper.21jingji.com, August 2016) 
<http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2016-08/17/content_45212.htm> accessed 10 January 2017. 
76 CJ Milhaupt and W Zheng, ‘Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm’ (2014) 103 Geo. LJ 
665. 
77 IMF, ‘Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem’, p 29. 
78 L Xia, ‘Conflicts Between Suntech CEO and Wuxi Government Coming to the Surface[尚德施正荣与无锡政
府矛盾公开化] ’ (finance.sina.com.cn, October 2012) 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20121020/000413424294.shtml> accessed 19 July 2017. 
79 ibid.  
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
65 
 A similar story happened in Xinyu city of Jiangxi province, the home to LDK solar. The city 
government decided to invest two hundred million RMB into the company, an amount that 
exceeded the maximum loans of local banks authorised to issue. In order to make the investment, 
the mayor of the city helped the company get a loan from Jiangxi Provincial International Trust 
and Investment Corporation, guaranteed by the fiscal revenues of Xinyu city. The rest of the 
funds came from the city's fiscal reserve and a grant from the provincial government. The 
company also enjoyed tax discounts and subsidies for electricity. 80  In addition to financial 
support, the city government allotted 15,000 acres land to the company and carried out land 
expropriation and relocation with great efficiency. When the financial situation of LDK solar 
deteriorated, the government of Jiangxi province provided 2 billion RMB to the company in May 
2012 and the Xinyu government injected about 1 billion RMB into the company.81 
Before these companies entered into the formal bankruptcy procedure, local governments had 
tried to negotiate with the bank creditors and persuade them to provide new loans. Such efforts 
had failed in Suntech, whose bank debts amounted to 7.1 billion when it entered into the 
reorganisation procedure in March 2013. As for LDK, Jiangxi government was able to facilitate 
the establishment of a bank syndicate to provide 2 billion loans to the company with an interest 
discount at 10%. However, the company's collapse was inevitable and finally, it entered into the 
reorganisation procedure. 
The reorganisation of Suntech is relatively successful as its core assets were acquired by 
Shunfeng Photovoltaic International Ltd and the repayment rate for creditors reached 31.55%, 
higher than that in a hypothetical liquidation (10%-15%).82 The same thing cannot be said of the 
reorganisation of LDK solar, which resulted in a repayment rate of 6.62%. Banks had voted 
against the reorganisation plan proposed by the company, however, it was crammed-down by the 
local court in the end. It should be noted that in both cases, not only domestic banks, the main 
creditors, have suffered great losses. Foreign investors of the dollar-denominated bonds were 
excluded from the domestic insolvency procedures and had received almost nothing after the 
main assets were distributed to domestic creditors.83 
So why local governments tried so hard to save the solar companies? A brief answer is that local 
governments have the dual objectives of promoting economic growth and maintaining social 
stability. The solar companies had made a great contribution to both of these objectives and their 
failure would be devastating. Solar companies contributed a large proportion of taxes to the local 
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governments. For example, LDK solar was the largest taxpayer in Xinyu city, accounting for 96% 
of total local tax revenues. In addition, solar companies had driven the fast growth of local GDP, 
leading to the promotion of local officials. The GDP of Xinyu city had increased at an annual 
rate of 15% since LDK solar was established. 84  Although Wuxi city has more diversified 
industries than Xinyu, Suntech had also been an important force for the city's economic growth. 
The stellar performance of the solar companies led to the promotion of the local officials.85 
Furthermore, the solar companies were the major employers of these cities and are deeply 
embedded in the local society. After the solar companies became financially distressed, local 
governments were worried that their collapse would undermine social stability and therefore 
unwilling for them to go to the bankruptcy procedure. For example, with about 12,000 employees, 
Suntech Power had employed 0.3% of the city's population. The number was even higher for 
LDK Solar, with 16,000 employees that amounted to 1.9% of the total population of Xinyu.86 
The bankruptcy of the solar companies would also have disastrous effects on their affiliated 
enterprises and suppliers, which were also important employers. For example, Suntech's 
affiliated companies and suppliers had more than 200,000 employees in total.87 
The case analysis above shows that bailouts are still frequent, and unprincipled in China. When 
large companies went into financial difficulties, the government would first try to bail them out 
rather than let them go into bankruptcy. Bailouts can be carried outside the bankruptcy law, 
through debt-to-equity swaps or direct capital injections. Bailouts can also be carried out through 
the reorganisation procedure, as provided by the bankruptcy law. In this way, the companies are 
often revived at the cost of creditors, undermining the basic principles of the bankruptcy law. For 
both political and economic reasons, bailouts are not only carried out for SOEs, but also for 
private companies that can cause severe social repercussions. The following section will further 
discuss this problem and propose a ‘law-based’ model for bailouts in China.   
4. A DISCUSSION ON BAILOUTS IN CHINA  
4.1 Bailouts: for and against 
The above discussions have argued that the Chinese government, especially local governments 
bail out large non-financial companies for both political and financial reasons, particularly on the 
account of social stability. The question naturally follows as to whether social stability can be the 
justification for bailouts, and governmental intervention in general.  
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From the perspective of political theories, the government has a duty to maintain social order, a 
‘sacred right which is the basis of all other rights’ as put by Rousseau.88 According to social 
contract theories, people surrender part of their natural rights and accede to a social contract in 
order to create a government that can impose law and order. Therefore, under the social 
contract, the government has a primary duty to maintain social order.  Without a powerful 
government, human beings would live in a state of disorder and violence.89 In the ‘state of nature’ 
described by Hobbes, people would be constantly engaged in the ‘war of all against all’.90 Since 
maintaining social order is implicit in the social contract, the government should intervene when 
socially important institutions fall apart and threaten stability.   
Further, governmental intervention is also justified on the economic ground that the government 
should correct a market failure, a situation in which the market fails to allocate resources 
efficiently. One major cause of market failure is an externality, which refers to the effects on a 
person’s well-being caused by the actions of another.91 Systemic risk, the risk that poses threats 
to financial stability, can also be viewed as a negative externality as it is an effect on other parties 
and the whole society caused by the actions of a firm. The 2008 financial crisis has provided 
ample evidence to the devastating and wide-reaching effects of systemic risk. One firm’s risk-
taking behaviours and financial distress will have spillover effects on other parties in the financial 
market, which is increasingly interdependent and interconnected.  In order to correct the market 
failure and prevent financial and social instability, governments had to bail out institutions that 
are too-big-to fail. Despite controversies on the use of taxpayer’s money to bail out financial 
institutions, a consensus has emerged as to the need for the government to step in to prevent 
systemic risk caused by the failure of sizeable institutions.92 
Analogous to large financial institutions, some non-financial institutions are also socially 
important as they produce social goods and may even be monopolists providing essential services 
such as railways, hospitals, utility companies.93 The failure of such institutions will result in 
negative externalities on the society and cause social instability. The social repercussions will be 
more serious if the failed institutions are major employers. For example, failures of SOEs in the 
Northeast of China, the old industrial base, would have disastrous effects on millions of workers 
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and their families, as these SOEs are the dominant employers in the region and the workers’ skills 
are industry-specific. 
However, there is no guarantee that governmental intervention can correct market failures and it 
is prone to inefficiencies.  Expectations for bailouts engender a moral hazard on companies to 
over-expand and take excessive risks as the government provides the implicit guarantee for their 
debt.94 The problem of moral hazard will also arise on the part of creditors, who are willing to 
offer loans to large companies with lower interest rates and fewer restrictions as they are 
presumed to be guaranteed by the government.95 This is especially true in SOEs, where the 
government often fails to impose hard-budget constraints and the creditors are not independent 
from the state.96 
Moreover, bailouts will create distortions and undermine the market efficiency, resulting in 
misallocation of resources. This is because bailouts often aim at saving weak firms rather than 
promoting the strong ones and politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out.97 This 
means bailout often involves a shifting of resources into inefficient sectors. Bailouts also transfer 
resources from the taxpayers to the inefficient companies, thereby shifting losses to the general 
public that should be born by the shareholders, managers and creditors.  
Given the problems, some have argued that ad hoc bailouts can only be used in limited 
circumstances and bankruptcy law can provide an effective alternative to bailouts. For example, 
it has been proposed that the liquidity problems of a financial institution can be solved by the 
automatic stay and DIP financing under the Chapter 11 of the US BC.98 To be specific, the debtor 
can obtain new financing by issuing new senior debts according to DIP financing rules. On the 
other hand, the automatic stay will prevent a run on the debtor's assets.  Moreover, the Chapter 
11 reorganisation and bailouts are not mutually exclusive. The reorganisation procedure can be 
used to implement the government's decision to provide rescue loans to the financial institution 
when the systemic risk is great. 
Compared with ad hoc bailouts, bankruptcy law provides for a collective mechanism for creditors 
to claim their debts under the supervision of the judiciary. It can ameliorate the problem of 
collective action,99 reduce dissipation and improve returns for creditors. In addition, bankruptcy 
law produces more predictable and consistent results, in contrast to ad hoc bailouts that usually 
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deviate from the contractual arrangements.100 However, bankruptcy can only be a better option 
than bailout if it is implemented in a transparent way.101  
4.2 Bailouts and Market Distortions 
As discussed above, bailouts in China are sometimes carried out within the framework of the 
bankruptcy law, particularly through the reorganisation procedure. However, the bankruptcy 
procedure lacks transparency and the returns for creditors are inconsistent. The basic principles 
of the bankruptcy law are often undermined. This has also undermined the ‘rule of law’ in general. 
Without sufficient legal constraints, local governments are able to use the bankruptcy law for 
their own economic and political interests. 
Moreover, bailouts have reinforced governmental policies that have distorted the market. To be 
specific, the subsidies given to SOEs and private companies, including governmental funds, low 
interest rates and monopoly rights,102 have created overcapacity and ‘zombie companies’ in the 
first place. Then the government uses public resources to bail them out.  The essence of the 
problem is that the government in China, both at the local and national level, still plays a pivotal 
role in allocating resources and has great command over the private sector despite years of 
market-oriented reform. 
As the insight of Hayek shows, the ultimate decision of allocating resources should be left to 
those familiar with the particular circumstances and can respond quickly to the changes. He 
argues forcibly that it is impossible for a central authority to possess all the knowledge that is 
necessary for making top-down planning, as such knowledge is dispersed among different 
individuals and cannot be conveyed to the central authority in the form of statistical 
information.103 To quote Hayek, ‘to assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind…is 
to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world’.104 Therefore, planning 
or control over resources should be decentralised, namely, ‘ultimate decisions must be left to the 
people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and 
of the resources immediately available to meet them’.105  
The past decades of reform in China is essentially a process of ‘decentralisation’, namely to 
relinquish the power over resources from the government to the market participants. The 
country’s miraculous economic growth since the reform stands in stark contrast to the 
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catastrophic failure of the planned economy in the past. This has provided strong evidence to 
Hayek’s theory that decentralisation is necessary as only those familiar can 
respond promptly when a society is experiencing rapid changes. However, the problems of 
bailouts in the country demonstrate that its transformation from a highly concentrated planned-
economy to a competitive market economy is far from complete.  
 In summary, the governmental intervention, both at the central and local level should be 
constrained as it poses impediments to the function of a competitive market economy. To achieve 
this, it is essential to implement a plethora of legal rules that ensure companies enter and exit the 
market in a fair and efficient way. This will be further discussed in the following section.  
4.3 Towards Law-based Bailouts  
The governmental practice of promoting local champions and bailing them out in the event of 
insolvency can be viewed as a manifestation of ‘administrative monopoly’ in China, which refers 
to using administrative power to promote or prevent economic activities.106 The Anti-Monopoly 
Law (AML) in China, which came into effect in 2008, contains a chapter on administrative 
monopoly that prohibits local governments from favouring local enterprises and imposing 
discriminatory measures on non-local enterprises.107 
The latest effort to constrain administrative monopoly is the Fair Competition Review System 
(FCRS) established by the State Council.108 The FCRS is complementary to the AML as it is an 
ex-ante control mechanism while the AML only imposes an ex-post control that requires the 
superior authorities of the violator to order the rectification. The FCRS requires government 
bodies to conduct a self-review before issuance of business-related regulations, which can only 
be implemented if they have no anti-competitive effects.109 Government bodies are also required 
to eradicate existing regulations that have anti-competitive effects. 110  This means a 
comprehensive overhaul of regulations will be carried out. Further, it encourages authorities to 
recruit third parties to conduct the evaluation of regulations and the results of the review should 
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be made public.  The antitrust authorities111 and State Council’s Law Affairs Office (LAO) are 
required to promulgate specific rules for implementing the self-review.  
According to the State Council, the aim of the FCRS is to ‘prevent the introduction of anti-
competitive regulations and gradually eradicate the regulations and activities that hinder fair 
competition and the establishment of a unified national market’. 112   The State Council 
emphasises that the core of the economic reform is to let the market play a decisive role in 
allocating resources and thereby excessive and inappropriate governmental intervention should 
be prevented.113  
Even though both the AML and FCRS lack effective sanctions and will not interfere with central 
government decisions and national industrial policies, they have established a legal regime that 
aims to constrain local protectionism and level the playground for companies in the domestic 
market. In this regard, the legal rules in the AML and FCRS are comparable to the EU state aids 
regime. However, focusing on eradicating the barriers to market entry, they fail to address the 
governmental intervention in the market exit, particularly the issue of bailouts.  
The rescue and restructuring aid (R&R aid) rule under the EU state aids law can be a reference 
in point for China. For example, the test of Market Economy Operator Principle  (MEOP) can be 
introduced under which saving a bankrupt business cannot justify injecting funds into a company 
unless a private investor would have done the same under normal market conditions.114 To apply 
the test into the Chinese context, when banks write off debts or carry out a debt-for-equity swap 
in a particular company, it should be satisfied that rational private parties would have carried out 
comparable transactions.  
If rescue loans are provided in the bankruptcy procedure, the principles of the bankruptcy law 
should be respected and the process should be fair and transparent. To be specific, the contractual 
positions of creditors should be protected and any adjustment of their interests should comply 
with the 'absolute priority rule' and the 'best interest rule'. This will enable creditors to predict 
their repayments based on the contractual arrangements.  This will also prevent the local 
governments forcing creditors to accept unfair arrangements for financial or political reasons. In 
addition, market participants, rather than the government, should make the ultimate decisions on 
critical issues such as the evaluation of the bankruptcy estate. As discussed above, the market 
forces can drive toward efficiency, but governmental interventions usually create distortions.  
The government’s role should be limited to fostering a sound social security system and 
facilitating the implementation of the bankruptcy law. Saving inefficient companies can only 
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help employment in the short term; it cannot improve the industrial output and generate new job 
opportunities. If inefficient companies are closed down, resources will be transferred to more 
efficient sectors, which will produce more employment.  
In a word, bankruptcy law can be combined with principles of the state aids law to facilitate 
market efficiency and reduce the distortions caused by governmental intervention. The state aids 
law contrains subsidies to market participants that distort the market competition. Bankruptcy 
law can ensure an orderly market exit and thus reallocate assets from inefficient industries to 
more productive uses. If bailouts in China are carried out strictly in accordance with the principles 
of the bankruptcy law and state aids law, the distorting effects on the market could be 
minimised.     
However, the effectiveness of legal institutions ultimately depends on the progress of political 
reform in the country. The future political reform should aim at providing for a strong social 
security system, changing the perverse incentives of local governments, and constraining 
governmental intervention with the rule of law. Only in this way can the distortions in the market 
be corrected and resources, including labour and capital, can be allocated more efficiently.   
5. CONCLUSION  
This article has discussed the bailouts of non-financial companies in China. It has found that 
despite years of reform, the government still uses an unprincipled, erratic approach to bailing out 
large companies. When bailouts are carried out in the framework of bankruptcy law, the 
procedure is opaque and dominated by local governments. Legal principles are often given way 
to the political and economic interests of the local governments, whose major concern is the 
social repercussions caused by the demise of large companies. This has distorted the market and 
undermined the rule of law. This article argues that although bailout or governmental intervention 
in general is necessary for maintaining social stability, it must be constrained by legal principles. 
Also, ‘too-big-to-fail’ companies in China are often created by governmental policies. In order 
to reduce the number of companies that need to be bailed out, it is imperative to curb 
governmental intervention that causes overcapacity and misallocation of resources. In the long 
term, the government must take on the daunting task of a deep political reform without causing 
severe social instability.  
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